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II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
THE SECURITIES ACTS
In the traditional view of jurisdiction, both in American243 and inter-
national law,244 a nation's regulatory laws are enforceable only if the
constituent elements of the violation occurred within the regulating
nation's territory. 4  This view has been liberalized to permit extrater-
ritorial application of regulatory laws in appropriate cases. 246  Ameri-
can courts generally follow the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States and accept subject matter jurisdic-
tion either if there is illegal conduct within the territory of the
United States, even if the harmful effects of the conduct occur outside
that territory, -4 7 or if illegal conduct occurs outside United States terri-
tory, but causes substantial harmful effects that are direct and foresee-
able within the United States.248 The Restatement also permits jurisdic-
243. See Blackmeer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
244. See generally Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts
Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1441, 1473-85 (1963).
245. This view was also reflected in the field of conflicts of law during the reign
of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) "vested rights" doctrine. It was
considered that a state's laws could not be applied to a wrong whose critical element
occurred in another state. See generally Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in
Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 Ono ST. LJ.
586 (1961).
246. See Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9. See also Note,
supra note 244, at 1473-85. This trend parallels the current trend toward "interest anal-
ysis" in conflicts thinking. See generally Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach,
57 CORxELL L. REv. 315 (1972); Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement
(Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 CoLUM. L. Rav. 279 (1972).
247. RESTATEMENT (SEOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF Tim UNITED STATES
£ 17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATONS] pro-
vides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct
outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory.
248. Id. § 18 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its terri-
tory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent ele-
ments of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems, or
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tion to be exercised over the forum's nationals regardless of effect or
the location of the national's illegal conduct. 4 9
The federal securities laws, and the 1934 Act in particular, have only
recently been applied to transactions that are substantially extraterrito-
rial2 50 During the last ten years, however, the courts have increasingly
accepted jurisdiction over securities violations that involve small
amounts of local "conduct" or "effect." Between the relatively clear
situations in which both significant conduct and effect occur either
domestically or outside the United States, the courts have struggled to
develop a workable and predictable standard for imposing American
jurisdiction to protect both American investors and the integrity of laws
regulating domestic securities transactions, without violating principles
of international law. The result has been, in general, to focus on the
degree of conduct within this country and the role of that conduct
within the overall transaction giving rise to a securities claim. Yet, the
courts have been reluctant to abandon a requirement of at least some
domestic effect.
A. The Persistent Requirement of Domestic Effect
The 1934 Act predicates jurisdiction in secondary trading on the use,
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii)
it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally rec-
ognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
See also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
The current extraterritorial approach may cause conflict between countries, especially
where two countries' laws require inconsistent conduct. Factors for each country to con-
sider in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction are set out in RnsTATnMENT (SEc-
CND) OF FOREIGN RELAMIONS § 40:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reason-
ably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
249. REsrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 30.
250. The first case in which a federal securities statute was considered in an extra-
territorial situation was Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See notes
271-73 infra and accompanying text. The first successful extraterritorial application
of the securities acts was not until 1963 in SEC v. Gulf Intercont'l Fin. Corp., 223 F.
Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). See notes 252-54 infra and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/2
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direct or indirect, of "any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change."'251  This language would appear to permit the exercise of
jurisdiction when only incidental use of interstate facilities in further-
ance of a securities transaction occurred, without regard to its effect.
Yet most decisions have depended, at least in part, on a finding of do-
mestic effect.
An extreme example is SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance
Corp.25z in which the SEC sought to enjoin a Canadian corporation
from offering or selling its notes in violation of the antifraud provisions
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.253 The court had little difficulty finding
substantive domestic conduct in furtherance of the scheme to defraud:
the corporation was controlled by Americans, who conceived the plan
in Florida and directed the offer and sale of the notes (and received
the invested money in the form of salaries and unsecured loans) by
the use of telephones and the mails. Yet the court struggled and found
domestic effect as well by taking judicial notice of the circulation in the
United States of Canadian newspapers in which the notes were ad-
vertised and reasoning that this constituted a domestic offer of
securities. 25
4
251. 1934 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Jurisdiction over the activities of
broker-dealers is based on their participation in the securities industry, as defined in vari-
ous provisions of § 3 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1970). See, e.g., 1934 Act § 7(c),
15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970) (margin requirements) ("any member of a national secu-
rities exchange or any broker or dealer"). See generally Note, United States Taxation
and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HAv. L. REv. 404, 442-43 & nn.102-
04 (1969).
252. 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
253. 1933 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1970).
254. Despite an absence of proof that any actual offer or sale of the securities was
made to an American, the court also found it necessary to take judicial notice of the
practice of Canadians to vacation in the United States (where they might be expected
to read their hometown newspapers) and of widespread American investment in the Ca-
nadian securities market. The opinion is confusing on the importance of these facts.
Since domestic conduct was clear-and the court went further by characterizing the Ca-
nadian corporation as a "conduit" through which the "true issuers," the American pro-
moters and domestic subsidiaries which they controlled, extended the illegal offer-ap-
parently the court took sweeping judicial notice of these facts in order to show domestic
effect. Yet it also characterized the domestic "offer," thus established, as a requisite
of local conduct:
It is sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction under the Acts that such offers
be made within the United States without a showing that such offers were ac-
cepted by actual sale, or that the alleged misrepresentations were in fact suc-
cessful in inducing the sale of such securities by reliance thereon.Washington University Open Sc olarship
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In Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd.2"" the Second Circuit found subject
matter jurisdiction in a stockholder's derivative action under section
16(b) of the 1934 Act 56 against a Canadian corporation to recover
short-swing profits made by that corporation in a purchase and sale of
the common stock of a domestic corporation on the New York Stock
Exchange. Again, domestic conduct was clear; the securities were
bought and sold on an American exchange through local brokers and
payment was made through a New York bank. But the court devoted
considerable attention to the domestic effect of the transaction and com-
pared the injury to "outside" stockholders caused by the trading of both
foreign and domestic "insiders. 251
A third example of judicial concern with effect despite significant
domestic conduct is SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc.,25 8 a rule
10b-52 59 case. After finding "very substantial activity" in the United
States in furtherance of an allegedly fraudulent offer to exchange the
stock of two foreign mutual funds, the court went on to find that "at
223 F. Supp. at 994-95 (footnotes omitted). Later, however, the court reasoned that
any use of interstate facilities in furtherance of the scheme satisfied the conduct re-
quirement:
It would appear that where the scheme is one which necessarily must be ac-
complished in part by use of the mails or interstate facilities within the limits
of our federal jurisdiction that even though the offer were made entirely out-
side the nation that the remedial protection of these sections may be invoked.
Id. at 995. Cf. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1960).
255. 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
256. 1934 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
257. Roth is one of several cases in which a defense under the § 30(b) exemption,
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970), is raised. The argument is that § 30(b) exempts from
the provisions of the 1934 Act any person who "transacts a business in securities without
the jurisdiction of the United States"; since the insider profits were made by a foreign
corporation "without the jurisdiction of the United States" in the securities of an Ameri-
can corporation, the section should apply. The Roth court answered this argument by
pointing out that the effect of insider trading on the American investing public is the
same regardless of whether the insider is itself an American. Further, the insider's use
of domestic facilities to transact its purchase and sale meant that it no longer transacted
business "without the jurisdiction of the United States." 405 F.2d at 422.
The § 30(b) exemption has also been judicially interpreted to apply not only to
broker-dealers in foreign securities or exchanges, but also to individual, occasional
transactions. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir.), rev'd
on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969). See generally Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Secu-
rities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. Rnv. 1015 (1969).
258. 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
259. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/2
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least three" American investors had been offered and sold the securities
involved in the scheme.20 ° The court specifically identified "the im-
pact . . . upon American investors" as an element of jurisdiction, and
declined to rule on the SEC's alternative theory that jurisdiction could
be entertained solely on the use of facilities of interstate commerce.2 11
The necessity of a finding of domestic effect is difficult to isolate
in the cases because most involve transactions with at least some aspects
of both conduct and effect in the United States. Thus, in a typical case
involving alleged violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws, some activity in furtherance of the effort to offer or sell securities
requires the use of domestic interstate facilities and almost necessarily
affects Americans, by reason of their equity ownership of the corpora-
tion whose securities are involved, their "exposure," however tenuous,
260. 474 F.2d at 357. The court noted that the "relative percentage" of American
investors involved was not determinative, citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957), in which personal jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company
in a California court on the basis of a single California policyholder was held not to
violate due process.
261. The SEC's "interstate commerce facilities use" theory has never been adopted
as the sole basis for extraterritorial application of the securities laws. The theory is
that the United States has an interest in the use to which its facilities are put, and there-
fore has plenary power over that use. Thus, Congress has power to regulate even inci-
dental use of interstate facilities connected with securities fraud. Since the United Fi-
nancial court found both domestic effect and more than incidental use of interstate facil-
ities, it did not have to consider the theory, although the court remarked that it had
"some merit." 474 F.2d at 358.
The "interstate commerce facilities use" theory, if adopted, would be enormously ex-
pansive of American jurisdiction in light of decisions construing the "jurisdictional
means" provisions of the securities acts in purely domestic transactions. As recently as
1959, a federal court stated that a sale of securities consummated
while traveling from one state to another in an automobile for the express pur-
pose of selling those securities does not establish a violation of the [1933] Act
* * **Nor is there a use of an instrument of interstate commerce when . . .
checks were sent back to the drawee bank in [another state] in the usual course
of business.
Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 902-03 (D. Colo. 1959). Only five years later, in
Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964), it was held that an intra-
state telephone call was sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction, the "character of the
instrument used" being determinative. Accord, Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (local calls sufficient if they play "material role in the transaction");
Ingraffia v. Belle Mead Hosp., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La. 1970). Contra, Burke
v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 438 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1971). Since the phrase "inter-
state commerce" is defined in § 3(a)(17) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17)
(1970), as "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
States, or between any foreign country and any State, or between any state and any place
or ship outside thereof," acceptance of the SEC's theory would arguably bring with it
an adoption of the expanded means test.
863
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to the offer, or by some other means. Only one case, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,62 has held that such effect by itself will support jurisdiction.
In Schoenbaum, another 10b-5 action, an American shareholder in
Banff Oil, a Canadian corporation, sued Banff's directors for consipiring
to defraud the corporation by causing it to sell its treasury shares at a
price they knew, on the basis of undisclosed inside information, to be
artificially low. The Second Circuit identified no domestic conduct in
furtherance of the scheme to defraud, but found jurisdiction on the
basis of the domestic effect of depressing the market price of Banff's
common stock, which was sold on an American exchange and owned
by American investors.20 3
The Second Circuit recently indicated in dictum that it would not
extend Schoenbaum's "effect" doctrine to permit jurisdiction over
purely extraterritorial transactions whose only connection with the
United States was their effect on an American corporation whose stock
was traded on an American exchange. In Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell264 the court found jurisdiction for a lOb-5
claim by an American investor who was fraudulently induced in the
United States to buy stock in an English corporation on an English ex-
change. The corporation's securities were not traded domestically, and
consequently the Schoenbaum holding was not in point. But the
Leasco court declined to premise jurisdiction solely on domestic fraudu-
lent conduct. Defendants argued that the securities were purchased
in the name of a foreign subsidiary of an American corporation, and
thus, since no American investor had standing to sue as a "purchaser"
of securities under section 10(b), there was no jurisdiction. Rather
than look solely at defendants' domestic conduct, the court reasoned
262. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). Schoenbaum is criticized in
Becker, Extraterritorial Dimensions of the Securities Exchange Act, 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & PoL. 233 (1969).
263. 405 F.2d at 208-09:
A fraud upon a corporation which has the effect of depriving it of fair compen-
sation for the issuance of its stock would necessarily have the effect of reducing
the equity of the corporation's shareholders and this reduction in equity would
be reflected in lower prices bid for the shares on the domestic stock market.
This impairment of the value of American investments by sales by the issuer
in a foreign country, allegedly in violation of the [19341 Act, has in our view,
a sufficiently serious effect upon United States commerce to warrant assertion
of jurisdiction for the protection of American investors and consideration of
the merits of plaintiff's claim.
264. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/2
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that the subsidiary was an alter ego of its American parent, and that
the latter had been recognized by the parties to the transaction as being
"intimately involved." The court then distinguished the situation in
which "a German and a Japanese businessman met in New York for
convenience, and the latter fraudulently induced the former to make
purchases of Japanese securities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
26 5
The effect of the Leasco opinion is two-fold. First, insofar as cases
without significant domestic conduct are concerned, it restricts the va-
lidity of Schoenbaum to situations involving fraud in foreign securities
sold on American exchanges.20 6 Second, in cases not involving
securities traded domestically, it requires both domestic conduct and
domestic effect.26 7  Thus, to use the court's Japanese illustration,
265. Id. at 1338.
266. The Leasco court first identified Schoenbaum's narrow holding that jurisdiction
would lie despite an absence of domestic conduct where the transaction involved stock
sold domestically and harmed American investors. Then, viewing that holding as resolv-
ing part of the question raised by § 18 of the Restatement, namely, under what circum-
stances will American courts entertain jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside Amer-
ican territory that causes domestic effect, the Leasco court expressed
most serious doubt whether, despite . . . Schoenbaum, § 10(b) would be appli-
cable simply because of the adverse effect of the fraudulently induced pur-
chases in England of securities of an English corporation, not traded in an or-
ganized American securities market, upon an American corporation whose
stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and its shareholders.
Id. at 1334, citing Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton & Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956). The court concluded that "[w]hen no fraud has
been practiced in this country and the purchase or sale has not been made here, we
would be hard pressed to find justification for going beyond Schoenbaum." 468 F.2d
at 1334.
267. This conclusion is implicit in the court's treatment of the defense that the pur-
chaser of the securities was not American. Had the Leasco court intended to hold that
substantial local conduct was in itself an adequate basis for jurisdiction, it could have
dismissed the argument as irrelevant. The court, however, after first arguing that it
was the American parent corporation which had a beneficial interest in the purchase,
went on to reason that even if the foreign subsidiary were the beneficial owner, "it would
be elevating form over substance to hold that this entails a conclusion that the purchases
did not have a sufficient effect in the United States to make § 10(b) apply." 468 F.2d
at 1338 (emphasis added). Finally, a pure conduct analysis would have made discussion
of the situation involving the German and Japanese businessmen superfluous. For fur-
ther discussion of the Leasco case, see Becker, supra note 262, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 554
(1973); 6 VAND. J. TRmNSNAT'L L. 687 (1973).
In Selas of America (Nederland) N.V. v. Selas Corp. of America, 365 F. Supp. 1382
(E.D. Pa. 1973), an American corporation reached an agreement in the United States
with employees of its wholly owned Dutch subsidiary to sell 60% of the shares of the
subsidiary to a second Dutch corporation to be organized by the employees. As a part of
the agreement, the parent was to receive the retained earnings of the subsidiary as of a
certain date and to acquire noncancellable preferred shares in the subsidiary. When aWashington University Open Scholarship
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even where every material element of a lOb-5 action occurred in the
United States, if the transaction had no effect on either the American
investing public (through its impact on the security's price in a domestic
market) or an American purchaser, the requisite effect would be ab-
sent and jurisdiction would not lie.
This analysis is supported by United States v. Clark,2" 8 a recent case
decided in the Southern District of New York, which confirmed the va-
lidity of effect considerations in all but the specialized Schoenbaum sit-
uation. The Clark court, after discussing Leasco and Schoenbaum,
concluded that their "cumulative effect" was that section 10(b) "cov-
er[s] at least charges of fraudulent conduct in the United States result-
ing in sales of securities abroad which have a substantial detrimental
effect upon the interests of American investors. 202 Thus, despite the
apparent existence of substantial conduct in the United States in fraud-
ulently inducing the overseas sale of debentures in a foreign subsidiary
corporation, the Clark court found it necessary also to find domestic
effect in the form of the artifical inflation of the domestic market price
of the parent corporation as a result of the sale of the subsidiary's se-
curities overseas. The effect in Clark is less direct than the effect in
Leasco, where the beneficial purchaser of the securities was an
American corporation, but some effect was deemed requisite to juris-
diction.2 70
dispute arose about the amount of earnings, the parent sued the subsidiary in the Nether-
lands to establish the primacy of its audit of the subsidiary's earnings and to reacquire
full control of the subsidiary. The subsidiary thereafter sued in the United States,
alleging that the parent had made fraudulent misrepresentations in the United States in
connection with both the original sale of the subsidiary's shares to the other Dutch cor-
poration and the acquisition of the preferred shares. The parent urged that no jurisdic-
tion should attach to a foreign transfer of securities in a foreign corporation to a foreign
purchaser, and invited the court to find that Schoenbaum, Leasco, and Travis require
some form of domestic effect, either on the American securities markets or an American
investor. The Selas court declined to decide whether domestic conduct alone was suffi-
cient to invoke jurisdiction by finding that "the transaction . . .ha[d] significant impact
on American securities markets." Id. at 1386. The court characterized the domestic
conduct as "sufficient" and cited the effect of the transactions on the earnings of the
parent, whose stock is publicly owned and registered on the American Stock Exchange.
268. 359 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
269. Id. at 134.
270. Clark, like United Financial, see notes 258-61 supra and accompanying text, in.
volved illegal conduct by a foreign subsidiary which was directed by the subsidiary's do.
mestic parent. Neither the Clark nor the United Financial court specified much conduct
occurring within the geographical boundaries of the United States that was an integral
part of the scheme to defraud. Rather, the courts evaluated the series of acts, includinghttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/2
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B. The Meaning of "Domestic Conduct"
A second consideration of courts faced with the question of extra-
territorial application of the securities acts is what domestic conduct is
sufficient to invoke jurisdiction. Generally, a court's primary concern
in analyzing the facts is with conduct. Those few courts that have dis-
missed cases for lack of jurisdiction have done so because domestic con-
duct was either absent or insignificant. Thus, in Kook v. Crang,271 in
which an American investor sued his Canadian broker for violation of
the margin requirements of section 7(c) of the 1934 Act2 72 when
extending credit to the investor for a Canadian investment, the
court held that, although the broker was registered with the SEC
and made use of the mails, jurisdiction would not lie without domestic
conduct that was "necessary and substantial." Since the broker's
American activities were not closely related to the extension of credit,
which was the basis for the investor's section 7 (c) action, the court dis-
missed the action.2 7 3
the parents' implementation of the plans, as a unified scheme and considered the fraudu-
lent acts of the subsidiaries to be attributable to their parents--and thus "domestic." In
this fashion, the definition of illegal or substantial domestic conduct has itself been ex-
panded.
271. 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
272. 1934 Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970), declares it unlawful for "any
broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to extend credit or arrange for the extension or
maintenance of credit to or for any customer" on non-exempted securities in violation
of the regulations established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
273. 182 F. Supp. at 390-91:
The question here is not whether there are contacts with the United States suf-
ficient to give this Court jurisdiction, no one questions that, but rather whether
Congress intended to make the statute applicable to these transactions. We
hold that such was not the intention of the legislature and that "jurisdiction"
as used in Section 30(b) contemplates some necessary and substantial act
within the United States.
Specifically, Kook required a showing of some domestic act directly or indirectly in fur-
therance of the extension or maintenance of credit.
Only two other cases have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In
Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), an Englishman
alleged that he was fraudulently induced to purchase the interest of a Bermudian corpo-
ration in an English corporation in violation of rule 10b-5. Both the misleading state-
ments alleged and the sale took place in England; the Bermudian corporation was a
closed investment company whose securities were not traded in the United States. The
Finch court held that a number of American contacts, including substantial American
control of the Bermudian corporation and the signing of a preliminary agreement to pur-
chase the shares (later re-executed, with some changes and the requisite formalities, in
England), were not sufficient to give it subject matter jurisdiction. The court found
Schoenbaum "dispositive," yet based its holding on both the fact that the "substance"
Washington University Open Scholarship
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That courts will not grant jurisdiction merely on the basis of estab-
lishing some conduct and effect is illustrated by Ferraioli v. Cantor,2 4
a pre-Schoenbaum case. In Ferraioli an American shareholder in
General Baking, an American corporation, brought a lOb-5 class action
against a Canadian corporation for selling its controlling shares in
General Baking to a second Canadian corporation at a price above the
market value on the basis of inside information, without informing the
American investor of the information or making the same offer avail-
able to him. As a part of the transfer of control between the two Cana-
dian corporations, the seller, by using the mails, caused its proxies to
be voted on its behalf and caused its designated directors in the United
States to resign. Rather than simply find that a minimum of domestic
conduct (use of the mails) had occurred or focus on the considerable
impact on American investors, the court found jurisdiction by character-
izing the directors' resignations as an integral part of the transfer of con-
trol in the target corporation, part of the course of conduct that gave
rise to the 10b-5 claim, and ignored considerations of effect.275
Similarly, in a recent Eighth Circuit case, Travis v. Anthes Imperial
Ltd., the court found jurisdiction in a 10b-5 case involving foreign
securities that were "neither registered nor traded on an organized
United States market. ' 27 6 The court purported to make a pure conduct
analysis, stating that the "essential issue is whether the defendants' con-
duct in the United States was of such significance to subject them to
. . . jurisdiction," and even went so far as to say that "subject matter
of the fraudulent conduct occurred outside the United States and that there was "no
showing of any domestic injury." Id. at 1349.
In Manus v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FEnD. Sec.
L. R P,. 93,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court dismissed a lob-5 claim for failure to
state a cause of action-noting that a suit for breach of a fiduciary duty cannot be "boot-
strapped" into lob-5 without a showing of scienter, citing Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971)-but added that the action also lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction since the parties were all aliens, the principal transactions took place out-
side the United States, and no detriment to American investors or markets resulted.
274. 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
275. The court's analysis reflects, at least in part, its concurrence in the parties' as-
sumption that the 1934 Act "presumptively" applies only to acts committed in the United
States. The question of "extraterritoriality" was not briefed or argued. Id. at 845. Per-
haps because of this presumption, the Ferraioli court was preoccupied with characteriz-
ing some part of the defendants' course of conduct as "domestic," instead of emphasizing
the policy of the Act of protecting American investors in American securities against
fraudulent acts, whether foreign or not. See generally Note, Extraterritorial Application
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 94 (1969).
276. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/2
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jurisdiction attaches whenever there has been significant conduct with
respect to alleged violations in the United States. 277  Such a position
would support jurisdiction in Leasco's hypothetical of the two foreign
businessmen and would, thereby, implicitly eliminate the effect re-
quirement. Since the plaintiffs in Travis were, however, defrauded
American investors, effect was present, and the court's attempted con-
finement of the jurisdictional question to conduct alone is not as signifi-
cant as it appears at first blush.78
It is doubtful that any analysis based primarily on consideration of
the quantity of domestic "conduct" or "effect" is satisfactory. Conduct
analysis runs the risk of preoccupation with jurisdictional "means," a
consideration more appropriate to questions of federal and state juris-
diction than to extraterritoriality. 279 Further, such an analysis may
277. Id. at 524.
278. Both Leasco and Travis based a conduct analysis on their interpretation of §
17 of the Restatement which, on its face, appears to require domestic conduct "relating
to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized," in the nation's territory. The
Leasco court examined one of the section's official illustrations to conclude that, despite
the quoted qualification, "[c]onduct within the territory alone would seem sufficient
from the standpoint of jurisdiction to prescribe a rule." 468 F.2d at 1334. The illustra-
tion is this:
X and Y are in State A. X makes a misrepresentation to Y. X and Y go
to State B. Solely because of the prior misrepresentations, Y delivers money
to X. A has jurisdiction to prescribe a criminal penalty for obtaining money
by false pretenses.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 17, Illustration 2. Nevertheless the
couit reasoned that while this may permit jurisdiction to attach purely to conduct, the
actual extent of jurisdiction must be determined by statutory construction. It was at this
point that the court distinguished the hypothetical of the foreign businessmen and dis-
cussed domestic effect. 468 F.2d at 1337-38.
The Travis court, to support its statement that jurisdiction attaches "whenever" there
is significant local conduct, cited both § 17 and the Leasco court's treatment of it, but
confused the matter by remarking that "[mloreover, clause (b) of § 17 [requiring ef-
fect] is met here because the defendants' conduct in the United States was directly re-
lated to and affected the interests of [American] shareholders." 473 F.2d at 524 n.15.
279. The expanded jurisdictional means test, see note 261 supra, may be acceptable
as a rationale for widespread SEC involvement in domestic securities practices. By trig-
gering federal mechanisms for registration, disclosure, and antifraud protection on the
least "interstate" activity imaginable, courts have provided domestic investors and mar-
kets with protection and confidence, largely without upsetting state regulation and phi-
losophy through enforcement of the blue sky laws. Involving the SEC and the full pan-
oply of federal securities legislation in largely extraterritorial matters on the basis of the
use of interstate facilities is another matter. To use the Leasco hypothetical, it makes
little sense to require representatives of two foreign businesses, whose activities and secu-
rities transactions have no domestic impact, to comply with the securities laws of the
United States or in effect to write into their understanding potential liabilities for viola-
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overlook the effect of conduct on domestic investors and the domestic
securities markets. Effect analysis more accurately reflects the con-
gressional policy of protecting American investors, but it runs the risk
of ignoring principles of international law and comity by focusing on
what may be only a minor part of a transaction that is best supervised
or adjudicated elsewhere.-8 0  Both analyses raise difficult problems of
comity and enforcement,2 ' and may, the more expansive they become,
interfere with other congressional aims such as encouraging foreign in-
tions of local law solely because their agreement to sell securities was reached in this
country.
280. This problem is dealt with in § 40 of the Restatement, see note 248 supra, but
is ignored for the most part by the courts. In a recent case, however, the Supreme Court
indicated that the policy of affording protection to purchasers of securities will not al-
ways override other considerations in international transactions. In Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), an American corporation which had purchased three
foreign corporations from a German seller brought a lob-5 action for misrepresentations
that allegedly occurred in the United States. Although the sales contract between the
parties called for arbitration of disputes before a tribunal in France, the buyer obtained
an injunction against the seller from proceeding further with arbitration.
On appeal, the Court was thus faced with a conflict between the policy of the securi-
ties acts to permit the plaintiff his choice of forum, and the arbitration agreement. The
Court had previously held, in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), that the antiwaiver
provision of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970); see 1934 Act § 29(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(b) (1970), renders an arbitration agreement void. The Scher; Court, however,
distinguished Wilko on the ground that it involved a purely domestic transaction, and
held that in international transactions, the arbitration agreement is controlling for two
reasons: (1) the advantage to the plaintiff of selecting his forum is "chimerical" be-
cause the defendant may avail himself more quickly of remedies in foreign tribunals;
and (2) advance determination of a forum is "an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction." 417 U.S. at 516 (Stewart, J.). Cf. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972).
Scherk is significant to the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction for two reasons. First,
the case suggests that, so long as a transaction is international in character, American
jurisdiction can be prevented by the existence of an arbitration agreement. Second, in
determining which transactions are governed by Wilko and which by Scherk, courts must
determine whether they are "international," and Scherk implies a more conservative test
than the jurisdiction cases. See 417 U.S. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Scherk
majority acknowledged that there may be cases in which the international "contacts" are
"insignificant" or "attenuated," id. at 517 n.ll and thus would come within Wilko; but
in Scherk virtually the entire impact was domestic, since the defrauded buyer was an
American corporation, owned by American shareholders and traded publicly in the
United States, and the fraudulent misrepresentations, although only a part of discussions
that were conducted for the most part in Europe, occurred in the United States.
281. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (discussing the possibility of retal-
iation by foreign governments against what they view as unwarranted interference by
the United States in their internal affairs).
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vestment in the United States to benefit the American balance of pay-
ments.2 2  As a result, the question of jurisdiction over international
transactions in securities should not be entrusted to piecemeal adjudica-
tion, but rather should be directed by SEC regulations under the guid-
ance of Congress. The role of the courts would then be limited to deter-
minations of whether imposing jurisdiction in particular cases violates
due process.
282. This policy was the motivation for the Interest Equalization Tax Act, Pub. L.
No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809 (1964), as amended, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4911-22,
which taxes American investment in foreign securities, and the Foreign Investors Tax
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1541, as amended, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954.
1§ 1248-49, which broadened favorable tax treatment for foreign investors in United
States securities by including large-scale foreign investment organizations and ended the
tax on dividend distributions by investment companies not engaged in domestic business
but dealing in American securities. See generally S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN, FOREIGN
INvESTORS TAX AcT (1967); Note, supra note 251, at 407-26; Note, Offshore Financing
for United States Business Ventures, 48 IND. L.J. 43 (1973). As a result of a more
favorable balance of payments picture and to reduce the limitation on foreign invest-
ments by Americans, the interest equalization tax rate was recently reduced to zero. S'ee
Exec. Order No. 11,766, 39 Fed. Reg. 3807 (1974).
For a discussion of the rather complex interrelationship between securities policy and
tax policy, see BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 257, at D-1 (June 19, 1974) (address
by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett to the Financial Times Conference). Mr. Garrett indi-
cates, for example, that because of the removal of the interest equalization tax, the SEC
will reevaluate its position on exempting securities that have "come to rest" abroad, that
is, securities resold to American investors by the foreign purchaser of a foreign issue.
Id. at D-3.
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